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RELIGION IN SOVIET MARXIST SOCIETIES: IDEOLOGY AND REALPOLITIK* 
Paul Peachey 
Dr . Paul Peachey (Mennonite ) is associate 
professor of sociology at Catholic University 
of America , Washington , DC . He received his 
Ph . D .  from University of Zlirich and special ­
izes in sociological theory and urban com ­
munity studies . During the 1960s he served as 
the executive secretary of the Church Peace 
Mission and was a founder and former 
chairperson of C . A . R . E . E .  He lived and 
traveled widely in Europe , including the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where he 
carried on extensive research . His most recent 
publication is The Residential Area Bond: 
Local Participation in Delocalized Studies 
(New York: Irvington Press , 1 98 3 )  co -edited 
with Erich Bodzenta and Wlod zimierz Mirowski . 
Uneasiness in the United States over the fate of rel igion in 
Eastern Europe persists as a disturbing factor in international 
relations today . Is the practice of religion free , as spokespersons from 
these societies frequently assure us , or are we to lend credence rather 
to the stories of continuing harassments of relig:.onists that re­
currently filter westward? 
Despite the increasing flow of information and the mov ement of 
persons between the United States and Eastern Europe , misinformation and 
even ignorance in the United States regarding these matters abound . On 
the one hand , religious practice in Eastern EuropE� is more open , 
widespread , and vital than many Americans , even in the churches , 
imagine . On the other hand , the sober fact remains: within the Soviet 
Marxist societal "model , "  "religion" remains intrinsically problematic . 
Relations between churches and the state are sometimes characterized as 
"normal ," yet given the premises of the societal model , normalcy 
a pproximates the state of a cease fire without a peace treaty . Thus a 
simple incident may trigger renewed hostilities . 
*This is a lightly revised version of a paper read in a meeting of the 
Southern Sociological Society in Atlanta , Georgia , March 31 , 1 971 . 
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Logically enough , the conflict be tween religion and regime turns in 
par t ,  or on the sur face , on the issues of theism and atheism . Taken 
alone , however , it is di fficul t to see how or why this problem should 
lead to unrelieved hostility o f  the policy toward r1�ligion . In fac t ,  
Soviet policy can accommodate "theism" inso far as it en tails mere 
meta physics ,  void of social signi ficance .  The system pc•si ts two possible 
types o f  world view , namely ma terialism and idealism . Religion is one , 
but not the only , form o f  idealism . Bu t ,  accordinsr to the theory , 
religion is also a form of aliena tion . The supposed otjec t of religion ,  
namely deity , is regarded as a figment o f  the alienated imagination . 
Insofar as religion , thus conceived , generates modes o f  behavior or 
ac tion ra ther than those genera ted by the society aE: a "materialist" 
phenomenon it can be viewed according to the model as dys func tional . In 
fac t ,  only by distor tion or negation can religio:1 be recuced or 
restric ted to "me taphysics . "  
A second , somewhat less ambiguous source of fric tion between 
religion1 and regime in the Soviet model is their intimate associa tion 
in pre -revolutionary czarist Russia . For cen turies th1� Or thodo:;< Church 
in old Russia had been integrated in to the structure of czarist 
autocracy . The Church was feudally organized , provided legitima tion for 
the crown , and served as tool of the Russian despots . In other Eas t 
Euro pean lands Chris tianity had likewise been es tablished in pre-Marxist 
times , though the forms of es tablishment varied as did the c:hurches 
themselves --Orthodox , Ca tholic , Protestant , e tc .  Today, though they are 
constitutionally dises tablished in the Soviet type Marxis t societies , it 
is far from clear that the churches have been able tc• free th·�mselves 
from their various "Cons tantinian" and /or caesaropapiEt legacies . Both 
the modali ties of s ta te in terven tion in religious pract:�ce and of church 
accommoda tion to such intervention are reminiscent o f  those legacies . 
The coming of the Oc tober Revolu tion and the establish ment of 
Soviet regimes in other lands , marked the end of a long era for 
churches . Par ticularly in the Russian case , the end of the monaJ�chy and 
its feu dal vestiges meant inevi table disloca tion fc,r the churches . 
Unless or until the churches possessed an identity otht�r than symbiosis 
wi th the crown , they could only resist the revolution. Much of Soviet 
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history s ince 1917 bec omes intel l ig ib le when the c om plex ity and pa thos 
of this displacement and transf ormation is com prehended . However 
deplorab le the policies of the Soviet regime v is-a-v is rel ig ious 
communities, g iven the historic legacy on the one hand, and the premises 
of the reg ime on the other, these polic ies are not devoid of logic . 
In a w ord, both rel igion and regime had been subver ted by the 
symbios is of the old order . A judgment on the caesaropapist m i l len ium 
sub specie aeterni tatis, it goes w ithout saying, is not in the human 
prov ince . But we can and must test the adequacy of the m odels which 
h is tory offers as options for our own ac tions and polic ies . A variety of 
criteria, whether drawn from the intrins ic qua l ities of religion, or the 
empirical domain of policy, can be invoked, depend ing on the purpose at 
hand . But these cannot be further pursued here . 
These two arguments, namely the past impr isonment of the churches 
in the feudal order and the atheistic c onception of the new order, may 
acc ount for much of the early host i lity of the Marxis t reg imes toward 
the churches . But meanwh i le the churches have been d isestablished, and 
have trothed their loya l ty to the new reg imes . Chr istians in the soc iety 
have increas ingly identified w ith, and prov ide support f or, the new 
socia l ist idea ls . Indeed, it is poss ib le to document from time to time 
the who lesome role that Christians play in a l leviating diff icu lt human 
situa tions, say, in factory or community, in the new reg imes . In 
particular ins tances, improved relations between relig ion and regime 
have developed . Adm in istrators have learned lessons, and bureaucratic 
routines have improved . Government departments charged w ith the 
supervision of religious affa irs at times do rectify injustices 
perpe tua ted by local officia ls on prac titioners of relig ion . 
On the other hand, outside observers may be f org iven some doub ts . 
Organized relig i on is a lways tempted sooner or later to accommoda te to 
power . Is that what is now tak ing place ? Is the integr ity of churches 
c om pr omised in the m ode of sta te con trol trea ted as "normal " in the 
Soviet system ? In any case, there is still no reason to bel ieve that a 
qualita tive change regarding the prob lem which religion poses to the 
Sov iet Marxist reg ime has taken place . Indeed, we shal l  argue the 
problem lies deeper than church c omplic ity in c zardom or than Marxist 
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atheism. Underlying Soviet Marxist difficulties with religion is the 
monistic conception of social reality which the system postulates and 
which (see below) Russian history prefigures. Society, according to this 
conception, is a single determinate system, while the individual in the 
society is simply the "ensemble" of all his social relations. The basic 
energies flow from the whole to the parts, from the center to the 
periphery, from the top to the bottom. Lower level units receive their 
meaning from higher levels, without a clear telos or end of their own. 
To such a view of reality, if a crude metaphor is permitted, religion 
intrudes as does a mistress in a married man's home. 
Before we develop this hypothesis more fully, we need some notion 
of the scope and scale of religious practise in these societies. 
Christianity, as already noted, is practised in several forms more 
extensively and openly in the soviet Marxist societies than most people 
in the West imagine. Indeed, the faith may well be a more vital force in 
the daily life of some of these peoples than in some western countries 
where religion supposedly is free. In the United States some 60-65% of 
the population supposedly belong to a church or a synagogue. There is of 
. course no hard count of church membership and even less so in Eastern 
Europe. 
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TABLE I 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF POPULATIONS IN SOVIET MARX:::ST SOCIE'riES* 
In percentages, by country ranked from high t:o low 
Total 
Population Roman No Religion/ 
Country in Millions Orthodox Catholic Protestant pther Atheist 
Rumanian 
Socialist 
Republic 20.5 85.0% 6.0% 6.5% 2.5% 
Polish People's 
Republic 32.9 91.0 2.5 6.5 
People's 
Republic 
of Hungary 10.4 65.0 25.0 4.5% 5.5 
Socialist Feder-
ative Republic 
of Yugoslavia 20.5 40.0 32.0 0.8 12.2 15.0 
I 
I 
Czechslovak I 
Socialist 
Republic 14.4 59.6 10.8 0.3 29.3 
German Democratic 
Republic 
17.0 
8.1 59.4 1.0 31.5 
People's 
Republic of 
Bulgaria 8.5 26.7 0.4 0.2 8.1 64.5 
Union of Soviet 
Socialist 
Republic 24.7 13.0 1.2 0.6 14.4 70.0 
People's Republic 
of Albania 2.1 20.7 10.3 69.0 ? 
Total population 368,000,000. Total Christian, all confessions ca. 135,000,000. 
*Compiled from data assembled by Giovanni Barberini ih "IDOC Europe Dossier Three," 
Church Within Socialism, edited by Erich Weinberger (Rome: IDOC International, 
1976). 
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It is instructive to note that according to Table I the rate of 
membership in the Soviet Marxist societies is as high as, or higher 
than, in the United States in all but three instances. Admittedly, these 
figures are not strictly comparable, quite apart from their dubious 
accuracy. Reinforced as they are by other indicators, however, these 
figures give some indication of the importance of religion in these 
societies. 
What are other indicators? Statistics can be compiled on parishes, 
cle�y, seminaries, theological students, and the like. In Albania the 
goal to end organized religion apparently has been realized. In the 
Soviet Union, though there have been periods of harshness, that goal 
appears nowhere in sight. In virtually all of the other countries, 
religions still receive--or since the revolution are receiving for the 
first time--some form of state subsidies. Theological faculties, paid by 
the state, are still part of the university system in the German 
Democratic Republic. Under other auspices, theological faculties are 
state-salaried in several other countries. In Hungary, when .the Marxists 
assumed control, nearly thirty years ago, separate agreements with the 
Catholic and Protestant churches provided for a diminishing 20-year 
annual subsidy to the churches as indemnity for the lands taken over by 
the state. Today, though expired, the payments continue, and clergy sit 
in the parliament. 
With all this, however, the importance of in- and between-country 
differences must be underscored. Three countries are predominantly 
Orthodox (Soviet Union, Rumania, Bulgaria); three. Roman catholic 
(Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary), though with significant Protestant 
minorities; one is predominately Protestant (German Democratic 
Republic); one is part Orthodox, part catholic (Yugoslavia). Political 
histories have been equally diverse. The soviet Union embraces many 
nationalities, and the number of Muslims in the population equals 
roughly the number of Christians. Virtually all of these countries 
include minority population groups within their territories which differ 
ethnically and religiously from the majority. In most cases the three 
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Chr istian trad itions, Orthodox, Roman Ca tholic, and Pro testant, 
func tioned earlier as s ta te churches or Volksk irchen . Accord ingly, 
espec ially in Orthodox and Catholic lands, relig ious d issenters and 
sectarians were persecu ted, some times severely . It is impo ctant to 
observe that various free church groups such as Pentecos tals at times 
fare be tter under the Marxist regimes than under " Chris tian " mor,archies . 
Wha t accounts for the great variation in the strength of the 
churches between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Ruman ia and 
Poland on the o ther ? The mos t obv ious var iable, of course, is the age of 
the respec tive reg imes, the Soviet Union hav ing been under Marxist 
con trol about tw ice as long as the other two . But it also appears that 
the case aga inst the church in the Soviet Union was a s tronger one than 
in the other two countries . In all three instances the church was bound 
up w i th the na tional culture . In the Polish and Ruman ian cases, however, 
the church had ma intained the spir i t  of the nation ' s  cultures aga inst 
hostile outs ide rule, whereas in the Russian case thE· church :1.ad been 
tied to the hostile, but native, dynasty . Church membHrsh ip statistics 
for these two countries, on the one hand, and geo pol itics, on the other 
hand, speak ra ther eloquently . Rel igion in these countries is hardly 
mere rel igion ! 
We can now pick up the main thread of our narrativ8 . Sov iet Marxist 
hos til ity to religion, we no ted above, is rooted in the mon istic 
conception of social real ity on wh ich the soc iety is bu ilt . This 
hypothes is we must now expla in . The charge that Soviet Marxism is 
"monistic, " indeed to talitarian, is an old one, and our case may thus 
appear bo th banal and futile . But pinn ing a label and understand ing a 
phenomenon, alas, are no t the same thing ! The justif ication for the 
presen t  paper is two-fold: (1 ) we little comprehend ei ther the sources 
or the na ture of Sov iet monism, either pos itively or ne9atively ; and (2) 
the problem of religion in Soviet Marx ist soc iety has scarcely been 
considered in rela tion to the monis t problem as distinct from the 
famil iar debates about a theism and the like . 
Both "monism, " and its opposite, "pluralism . "
2 
represent "contrast 
models " of social theory . A "monist model " refers to a social order in 
wh ich all power is " publ ic power ", wh ile a " pluralist model " refers to 
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one in which there is "either a balance or a fusion of private and 
public power", 
3 groups. " These 
with private power 
terms, though 
resting "in autonomous social 
modern, are reminiscent of older 
debates, such as the controversy in medieval philosophy over realism and 
nominalism as conceptual problems. Employed sociologically, "realism" 
signifies that "society is the true and primary reality, while the 
individual is the derivative phenomenon. " "Nominalism," on the other 
hand, means that "the individual is the primary and true reality, while 
society is something either derivative or a mere sum of individuals. "4 
With terms thus defined, Soviet Marxist societies are clearly 
"realist" in nature. All power is collected in a single, centrally 
directed system. Constitutionally, citizens are guaranteed basic rights 
and securities. But these rights are created by the state, rather than 
acknowledged as preexisting. The citizen possesses no rights independent 
of, or eventually in opposition to, the state. Since all human reality 
is socially constituted, how can one speak of pre-political rights? 
"From the point of view of Marxism, the essence of any element in the 
structure of a social organism or the connections between these elements 
can be disclosed only if the system of social relations is studied as 
the general which is concretely expressed in these elements and 
connections, determining their essence," writes a committee of contempo­
rary Soviet theorists. At the same time, they reject as "social 
atomistics" the view of the "individual" as a social atom 
characterized by a set of immutable traits supposedly rooted in his 
biological nature, in the depth of the unconscious, and so on and so 
forth . .,S 
Only when this conception of social and political reality is 
understood does the force of the case against religion become clear. In 
this conception religion has no place, no reality. There is no object to 
which religion is the response. Rather it rests on illusion as the 
projection of alienated spirit. Relig.i.on, which in a pluralistic system 
might serve as source of independent variation, is here at best 
parasitic. Following Lenin, Soviet policy at the most protects the right 
of the believer to continue religious practise, confident that religion 
will disappear of itself as the revolution matures. Frequently, however, 
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as we shall see in a moment, policy is not at its best, particularly 
when religion raises its head anew at points where it should have 
disappeared. Once the basic theory is granted and believed, religion 
indeed can be made to appear enigmatic and pathological! 
As already implied, however, the arguments on which the Soviet 
Marxist case rests are arguments which have played a role in the 
develoment of Western political theory. Some analysts like to charac­
terize Marxism as a Western heresy rather than as something esoteric or 
Eastern. But in Soviet Marxism, or rather in the larger phenomenon 
constituted by Soviet Marxism and the Western tradition to which it is 
joined in opposition, we confront a reality far more formidable than two 
conflicting doctrines. It is rather the fusion of the opposing idea 
systems into constellations of historical power that constitutes the 
peril. 
Hegel, it must be remembered, developed a holistic conception of 
political reality in reply to the competition and conflict which he 
regarded as endemic in societies based on the market economy. In 
substituting materialism for idealism, Marx may have turned Hegel right 
side up. Yet the decisive fact is that Hegel' s realism prevailed. But it 
was not as antidote to Western nominalism and anarchy that Hegelian 
holism was to make history, but rather as legitimation for a 
civilization and culture in Russia which had never known pluralism. Thus 
the problem in Soviet Society is not too much atheism, but too little. 
Soviet Marxist society is a highly sacral phenomenon which mistakes 
avowed atheism for secularity. Aren T. van Leeuwen coined the concept 
"ontocratic" to describe those political traditions in which the "state 
is the embodiment of the cosmic totality. "  The Byzantine tradition, in 
which the Russian monarchy was rooted, was an example of the ontocratic 
conception. Indeed, van Leeuwen continues, "the West has only with great 
6 difficulty contrived to escape its (ontocracy' s) blinding spell. " 
Max Weber, it will be recalled, advanced the notion of an "elective 
affinity" of ideas for certain corresponding historical configurations. 
If the reception of Marxist theory into the flesh and blood of Russian 
history appears to illustrate Weber' s conception, perhaps the same can 
be said with regard to the reception of the nominalist half of the 
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debate in European political theory in the flesh and blood of American 
history. Each in its own way thus appears as half-truth and perhaps as 
heresy. That, of course, is another topic. It is a possibility suggested 
here only to underscore the need to see the historical force of the 
problem of religious liberty in the Soviet Marxist system. Perhaps, 
particularly in the light of the Helsinki Accord, we can only protest in 
the West. But we should at least understand and recognize the historical 
limits within which political incumbents in that system act. So we turn 
finally to examine a few of their policies. 
Constitutional and other legal stipulations concerning religion 
reflect the same Enlightenment conceptions which one finds in Western 
constitutions. The Decree of the Soviet People's Commissars of January 
23, 1918, states that "the church is separated from the state," and that 
"every citizen may confess any religion or profess none at all." Article 
124 of the constitution of the USSR says: "In order to ensure to 
citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated 
from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious 
worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda are recognized for all 
citizens."7 
These provisions, it can rightly be claimed, are enforced in the 
Soviet Union and in other Soviet Marxist societies. Constitutional 
language, of course, varies from country to country. Where these basic 
provisions have not been enforced or have been violated, it is because 
implementation of other measures result in indirect contradiction. What 
are those other provisions? The most important category is doubtless the 
provisions which pertain to religious buildings and artifacts. At the 
time of the revolution such properties were inventoried and nation­
alized. Buildings and religious objects were then to be made available 
without cost to authorized religious groups for use. Only duly 
registered groups, of course, could receive permission to use such 
property. But this arrangement inserts· a local public official into the 
heart of local parish activity as a normal procedure. 
Another category of provisions pertain to the definition of 
religious practise. The guarantee of religious liberty applies both to 
beliefs held privately by the individual citizen, and to worship or the 
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enactment of the cult. Belief is treated as a private matter. It may not 
be mentioned, for example, in personal civil documents. But corporate 
worship is another matter. Even when confined to the regular liturgy of 
divine service, it becomes in some degree a social act. So a 
contemporary Marxist scholar asks, "How can religion be maintained as a 
private matter? . . .  When religion ceases to remain a domestic cult and 
begins to express itself through an organized church, the private matter 
takes on a special social dimension. A social dimension is an externally 
social manifestation which no longer is a private matter. It becomes 
society within society. Its relationships being juridically and legally 
8 regulated by the latter." The attempt to draw a line between the 
private and the social dimensions of religion, in order to permit only 
the former, ends in ambiguities which cannot be resolved. 
In practise, then, the two principles, namely religious liberty, 
and separation of church and state, collide. This contradiction is 
dramatized in the dissenting religious groups that have surfaced over 
the last decade, both in the Orthodox Church and among the Evangelical 
Baptists. In the latter instance the existing leadership is not only 
challenged ,  but a competing organization has been effected. In both 
instances, however, the c riticism pertains to concessions which the 
existing hierarchies have made to the state for the permission to 
operate as churches. Significantly, the constitutional point is raised. 
State authorities, in regulating religious life as indicated above, and 
hierarchies, in accepting such supervision, are both accused of 
9 violating the constitutional separation of religion from the state. 
Westerners critical or impatient with this state of affairs can 
benefit from a glance back on Western history. Here the era of the 
Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century is instructive. Luther, 
it will be recalled, confronting t.he political turmoil surrounding 
religious reform, finally distinguish:!d the inner and outer orders of 
church life, and looked to the magisLracy to regulate the latter. The 
radicals then (Anabaptists), as the Initiativniki in Soviet Union in the 
1960s and 1970s, rejected this distinction. Religious faith and life 
must be independent! 
In the long run, however, the view of the radicals was to prevail. 
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But the triumph of separation of church and state in the Western 
tradition owes more to secularizing forces than to the churches' own 
doctrine, even though today that separation does enjoy theological 
sanction as well. In effect, the notion of christendom, a unified 
civilization, which prevailed in medieval Europe, appears highly 
analogous to the Soviet model today, however different the particular 
formulations. Only the pluralization of Western societies, as an 
historical reality, appears to have nurtured the insight that human 
existence is fundamentally or intrinsically pluralistic. The problem is 
not the achievement of pluralism but its recognition. This is not to 
defend any particular pluralism--there is much that is problematic in 
what passes for pluralism in the United States today. Certainly it is 
equally important, and the more so when pluralist forces flourish, to 
look after the "core universe" which sustains groups and communities. 
It is not readily evident how other societies should respond to the 
Soviet predicament. It may well be appropriate for Soviet political 
leaders to be held somehow accountable before world opinion in accord 
to standards of religious liberty increasingly prevailing in global 
values. Whether such challenges aid or hinder the cause may. not be 
readily determined. In any event, in the US-US SR confrontation, not only 
two societal conceptions face each other, but two histories as well. 
Perhaps until this dual fact is more fully and widely recognized and 
understood, and until pluralizing transformations temper the Soviet 
model, the uneasy cease fire now in effect will not yield to a viable 
peace. 
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